Roth, A. E. "Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2, no. 4 (December 1989): 353–365.

The usual justification for Nash equilibrium behavior involves (at least implicitly) the assumption that it is common knowledge among the players both that the Nash equilibrium in question will be ...

Assignment 2 (with soln) 09/27 Independence axiom; risk attitudes Assignment 3 (with soln) 10/04 Resolving Allais paradox; evolution of risk attitudes Assignment 4 (with soln) 10/11 Choice under risk; ...

We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, ...